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Abstract 
Cloud computing has become one of the most popular industry terms since Google and IBM invested 
to build large data centers that users can program and research over the Internet. Many cloud 
computing services like Google Apps and Fileserve rely on different approaches of price 
discrimination to enhance their profits. In this research, we examine four different cases in which a 
cloud computing service provider can decide to implement pooling and separating strategy for QoS 
and advertising, respectively. We find that users may enjoy free service if the size of advertising 
market is large, or they have to wait a fixed delay time to initiate their services. In addition, from the 
perspective of a service provider, we point out that the advertising revenue is one of the motivations to 
implement versioning, but the capacity cost is one of the concerns to only offer the top quality service. 
We also find that the optimal demand for cloud computing services will be more flexible if the service 
provider can adopt separating strategy for QoS and advertising concurrently. Moreover, this study 
explores the value of the fixed delay time and shows that it is useful under certain conditions, even if 
quality differentiation has been carried out. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing has become one of the most popular industry terms since Google and IBM 
invested to build large data centers that users can program and research over the Internet. It is expected 
that worldwide cloud services revenue will has a potential to reach $148.8 billion in 2014. In addition 
to the two IT giants, other companies like Yahoo, Amazon, eBay, and Microsoft have also offered 
their own services that apply cloud computing (Lohr, 2007; Gonsalves, 2010). For the individual, 
cloud computing not only create the advantages in terms of mobility and collaboration, but also 
eliminate the concerns of configuring and updating desktop software (Hayes, 2008). According to 
Gartner, the world’s leading information technology research and advisory company, cloud computing 
can be divided into two categories which are composed of services and technologies. Both SaaS 
(Software as a Service) applications and vendors that offer access to storage and processing 
capabilities over the Internet can be classified into the group of cloud computing services. The other 
services, such as Skype (an application of P2P technology) and gene sequencing, can be regarded as 
cloud computing technologies because they are fairly resource-consuming jobs, which rely on the 
assistance of distributed computing (Brodkin, 2008). 
Price discrimination, which is also known as versioning, is a marketing strategy that provides 
different versions of a service which sells at different prices. For example, consumers can freely use 
Google Apps applications with the cost of receiving advertising messages, or buy high-quality version 
with larger storage volumes and enhanced features. Buyya et al. (2009) have made comparison of 
some representative cloud computing services from several fundamental properties including service 
type, QoS (Quality of Service), and access interface. In order to offer highly reliable cloud computing 
services, service providers may add capacities according to the required service level through QoS 
parameters (Armbrust et al., 2010). For example, FileServe (www.fileserve.com) shows that the 
average download speed is about 6 MB per minute for VIP users but lower than 1MB for general users. 
In addition, general users are forced to wait a fixed time and then input verified code to start the 
downloading service. Since a general user has suffered from higher queuing delay and even receives 
advertising messages, it is interesting to better understand the reason that a general user cannot 
download files instantly until a fixed delay time is completed. 
Therefore, motivated by these kinds of emerging services, we study the link between capacity 
planning and advertising, and the versioning structure under which the decisions are being made. In 
addition, accurately estimating the system usage rate can help match capacities and workload much 
more closely so that the capacity cost can be reduced. However, few studies analyze cloud computing 
from the perspectives of capacity planning and marketing strategy concurrently. In this research, our 
research questions are: (1) What factors make a versioning strategy profitable? When should a service 
provider only offer the top quality service? (2) If more and more users become active (that is, a higher 
system usage rate), what should the service provider do? Likewise, we want to known the solution 
when considering the size of advertising market and the length of the fixed delay time. (3) Since 
advertising and QoS can be an effective tool to “produce” a low-quality service, why do some service 
providers offering cloud computing services still postpone the delivery of service? 
2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
From the business perspective, pricing strategies for cloud computing services can be analyzed in 
conjunction with capacity investment decisions and QoS guarantees; moreover, the value of cloud 
computing services is also an important research dimension which should be further explored from the 
economic perspective on service science (Bardhan et al., 2010; Marston et al., 2011). To make 
consumers be willing to use cloud computing services in substitution for desktop applications, cloud 
computing service providers have to maintain specific QoS for consumers. Wei et al. (2010) attempt to 
solve the problem of resource allocation in a cloud computing service by considering the scenario 
where each user decides the amount of required resource to maximize individual utility independently 
and then the service provider minimize the cost with taking QoS and budget limitations into account. 
Demirkan et al. (2010) examine the performance of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) setup under 
different coordination strategies between an application service provider (ASP) and an application 
infrastructure provider (AIP). Their analysis indicates that the maximum overall surplus that can be 
achieved by a social planner can also be performed by the coordination between ASP and AIP. 
Empirical study has suggested government subsidize the adoption of cloud computing solutions 
because the introduction and diffusion of cloud computing services is likely to create a positive effect 
on business creation, GDP and employment (Etro, 2009).  
Comparisons between traditional shrink-wrap software (SWS) and SaaS have been analyzed by 
prior studies. Choudhary (2007), comparing the difference in optimal service quality between SWS 
and SaaS, considers a two-period model in which both services can be upgraded in each period. In 
addition to the price in each period, a SWS provider can offer an upgrade option for the consumers 
purchasing the service in the first period, while a SaaS provider can utilize the advantage of offering 
the benefits of service development faster than the SWS provider. Their analysis shows that the SaaS 
provider invests much in product development under most conditions. Fan et al. (2009), studying the 
competition between SWS and SaaS, focus on users’ perspective of implement cost and characterize 
SaaS as a special SWS with the queuing delay. Their analysis indicates that an increase of system 
usage or a higher variable IT capacity cost can lead to lower quality improvement for SaaS providers. 
In two papers related to our work, Jin (2007) analyzes price discrimination in a monopolistic 
market with network externalities and Fan et al. (2007−8) develop a model to examine optimal 
strategies for service providers to distribute digital content. Jin considers a monopolist sells products 
which are differentiated along a single quality dimension. His finding indicates that the monopolist’s 
optimal product strategy is to offer two compatible products with different qualities but only the top 
quality product if network externality is absent. Our cases complement Jin’s work (2007) by involving 
the impact of QoS, the advertising level, and the fixed delay time on service quality. Fan et al. 
(2007−8) suggest that a service provider offering digital content in a traditional channel and online 
channel is better off providing both pricing and advertising options to the consumers who purchase 
digital content online. Although focusing on the online channel, our analysis makes these options more 
flexible and studies the advertising strategy under the concern of capacity planning and the demand of 
advertisers. 
Our major contribution is extending the existing literature by modelling capacity planning and 
advertising strategy together. Capacity planning is closely associated with the service quality provided 
in clouding computing services, while advertisements supply additional revenue for service providers 
and make free services possible. In order to make the implication of advertising strategy more 
insightful, we involve the demand of advertisers in our model so we can analyze the impact of 
advertising market on the advertising level. Moreover, the fixed delay time is a common used policy in 
file exchange services but rarely adopted in other cloud computing services like Google Apps. We 
show that the timing of adopting the fixed delay time to downgrade a low-quality service depends on 
the structure of price discrimination and the impacts of outside environment like capacity cost and 
advertising market. 
3 THE MODEL 
In this study, we consider a cloud computing service provider who focus on remote access to 
services and computing resource provided over the Internet in a monopolistic market. Therefore, the 
provider can base on QoS to price the service, deploy advertisements on user interface to increase 
revenue, and even setup a fixed delay time to version the cloud service. In addition, the service 
provider has to implement capacity planning to avoid a waste of system capacity like bandwidth and 
computing resource because only a portion of all users will access the service at any time. In order to 
make the service look like a desktop application, the service provider needs to consider the queuing 
delay and the processing rate for his/her service. Here, following prior study, we use M/M/1 queue to 
formulate the average queuing delay for a subscribing consumer, which can be represented 
as ( )1g m l= -  wherem is the service rate andl is consumer’s arrival rate (Tan and Mookerjee, 
2005). A summary of all the variables used in the present paper appears in Table A, which is given in 
the Appendix.  Therefore, the total capacity cost of the service can be expressed as  . For 
convenience, we assume that the base service quality (the service quality without any interference like 
advertisements) is if the maximal average queuing delay is lower than a specific threshold d . 
A fixed delay time is different from the queuing delay. For a file exchange service, a user can 
utilize agent technology such as a file download scheduler to download his wanted files in the 
midnight and therefore the impact of the queuing delay is smoothed. However, if the file exchange 
service requires users input verified codes after a fixed delay time and then allow a file download 
provided that his/her input is correct, this user must wait and input verified codes after the fixed delay 
time is over; otherwise, he/she may lose the opportunity of downloading files because the service will 
automatically disconnect the access if the verified code doesn’t be entered within an allowable time 
limitation. That is, the fixed delay time forces users keep something in mind that they have to stand by 
until the fixed delay time is completed. Therefore, we denote the fixed delay time as T and the value of 
time as . 
Most the operations of web applications rely on the subscription fees charged from users and the 
advertising fees charged from advertisers. Accordingly, the service provider can charge consumers a 
subscription fee p and advertisers an advertising fee . The advertising level is affected by the size of 
advertising market and the advertising fee. For convenience, we assume that the demand of advertisers 
is equal to the level of advertising and capture the relation between the advertising fee and the 
advertising level by adopting a linear function a M   , where M is the size of the advertising 
market and a is the demand of advertisers (Prasad et al., 2003). Thus, the service quality with 
advertisements and a fixed delay time can be expressed by a T   . Because consumers are 
heterogeneous and have different sensitivity to the service quality, we characterize each consumer 
by , which represents his/her valuation for the service. Here, we consider that the service provider 
designs his/her product line by developing the service without a fixed delay time first and then 
degrades it by a fixed delay time to obtain a low-quality version. Consequently, the service provider 
can charge consumers different subscription fees according to what they subscribe. We denote the 
price (service quality) of the high-quality and low-quality service as hp and lp  ( hs and ls ), 
respectively. 
Next, the service provider can consider delivering advertisements to all consumers or only 
consumers subscribing the low-quality service. The former is known as a pooling strategy on 
advertising, while the latter is known as a separating strategy on the advertising level. Similarly, 
he/she can guarantee QoS to all consumers or only consumers subscribing the high-quality service, 
which are known as a pooling strategy and a separating strategy on QoS, respectively. If the service 
provider doesn’t guarantee QoS for those consumers subscribing the low-quality service, we denote 
the downgrading base service quality as  where  0,1  because the access time of the low-
quality service is unstable and the service can temporarily be suspended if any request issued from 
those subscribing the high-quality service arrives. Accordingly, we can base on revenue dimension 
from advertisement income and cost dimension form capacity planning to analyze how the service 
provider controls the advertising level and the distribution of versions when the system usage rate, the 
size of advertising market, and the fixed delay time vary. All the four cases we study in this research 
are shown in Table 1. 
Subsequently, given  I, II, III, IVi , we let consumer of type ,i l be indifferent between 
subscribing the low-quality service and doing nothing and consumer of type ,i h be indifferent between 
the two services. We assume consumer’s type follows a cumulative distribution function F which has 
a continuous probability density function f. We then have , ,,
, ,
i h i l
i h
i h i l
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s s
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maximizes his/her profit by choosing prices and the advertising level as follows. 
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Table 1. All cases for the advertising and QoS strategy 
             Revenue Dimension
 
Cost Dimension 
Advertising 
Pooling Strategy Separating Strategy 
QoS 
Pooling Strategy 
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I, I
h
l
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
 
 
      (I) 
III,
III, III
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Separating Strategy 
II, II
II, II
h
l
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
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 
     (II)
IV,
IV, IV
h
l
s
s a T

  

     (IV) 
 
At any time, only a portion of all the consumers uses the cloud service. Thus, lettingb be the 
average usage rate of all the consumers, we have   ,1i i lF    and   ,1i i hF     
for  I, IIIi and  II, IVi , respectively. Furthermore, under optimal pricing and advertising 
strategy, the service provider can optimize his/her profit by choosing i as follows (Fan et al., 2009). 
1
i i d
              (3.2) 
Because the service provider can utilize idle capacities to serve consumers subscribing the low-quality 
service but suspend their services while any new request issued from those subscribing the high-
quality service arrives, we can express the capacity cost as follows. 
    
    
,
,
11 , I, III
11 , II, IV
i l
i h
F if i
d
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F if i
d
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  
                  
     (3.3) 
To convert the service provider’s problem into an equivalent but tractable form, we follow the 
approach proposed by Jing (2000) to regard the two services’ respective lower market boundaries, ,i l  
and ,i h , as the service provider’s decision variables. Consequently, the prices of the two services 
become dependent variables as follows:  , , , , , , , , ,,i l i l i l i h i h i h i l i h i lp s p s s              (3.4) 
In this study, we are interested in a more general scenario when there are demand for both high-quality 
service and low-quality service (that is, , ,0 1i l i h     ). In addition, we consider the limitation that 
the demands for both services do not cover the whole market but relax it in the fifth section. 
4 POLLING AND SEPERATING STRATEGY 
Subsequently, we assume that     1 F f  is a decreasing function, which is known as the 
monotone hazard rate condition satisfied by many families of probability distributions, such as the 
uniform, the normal, the exponential, and the Poisson (Milgrom, 1982). For convenience, we show all 
implicit solutions in Table 2; however, we don’t give explicit solutions in the present study because 
there is no closed form in case III and IV even if adopting a uniform function. Although there are 
closed forms in case I and II when adopting a uniform function, most results are uncertain due to the 
complexity. Instead of solving the explicit solutions, we directly analyze the implicit solutions to 
derive useful insights. Based on the comparison in ,i h , ,i l , and ia among all cases in Table 2, we can 
have the following findings. 
 
Table 2. The implicit solutions for all decision variables 
Variables 
Case i 
,i h  ,i l  ia  
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 
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IV 
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i h i h i l
F M a a
f s s
  

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Proposition 1. (All the proofs can be found in the Appendix.) 
1. Comparing to pooling strategy for QoS, if only guaranteeing the average queuing delay for 
consumers subscribing the high-quality service, the service provider will increase the demand for 
the low-quality service but lower the demand for the high-quality service. 
2. Comparing to pooling strategy for the advertising level, if only deploying advertisements for the 
low-quality service, the service provider will raise the advertising level. 
3. In case II and IV, the service provider will offer the low-quality service if offering the high-
quality service. 
4. In case I and III, the service provider won’t sell the low-quality service if the capacity cost is too 
expensive. 
 
We find that the revenue of advertising is one of the motivations for the service provider to adopt 
price discrimination, while the capacity cost is one of the concerns to only offer the top quality service. 
Our findings complement Jing’s work (2007), in which network externally can be one of the 
incentives for the service provider to implement versioning strategy. In addition, based on different 
strategies on QoS, the service provider will adjust the distribution of versions. Compared to the 
scenario where the service provider offers reliable access for all consumers, when only offering 
reliable access for consumers subscribing the high-quality service, the service provider may decrease 
the number of consumers using the high-quality service to reduce the capacity cost, but increase the 
number of consumers using the low-quality service to raise the revenue of advertising. Finally, 
comparing to the consumers with high sensitivity to service quality, the consumers with low 
sensitivity to service quality is less against advertisements. Thus, the service provider will raise the 
advertising level if he/she implements separating strategy on advertising. Subsequently, we use the 
technique of implicit differentiation to examine the impact of the system usage rate, the size of 
advertising market, and the fixed delay time on decision variables we are interested in. In order to ease 
exposition, we assume consumers are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. All computational results are 
shown in Table 3. Next, we summarize the findings in the four cases as follows. 
 
Table 3. Impact of parameters on consumer distribution and advertisements 
 Case I Case II Case III and IV 
 I,h  I,l  Ia II,h II,l IIa III,h , IV,h III,l , IV,l  IIIa , IVa
    +  +     + +  
M     +    +    + 
T    +   +   
                    + increase; decrease; * uncertain;   no effect 
 
Lemma 1. Pooling QoS and Advertising (Case I) 
1. The system usage rate, the size of advertising market, and the fixed delay time don’t affect the 
optimal demand for the high-quality service. Formally, I, 0h    , I, 0h M    , and 
I, 0h T    . 
2. The optimal demand for the cloud computing service will decrease with the system usage rate, 
but increase with the size of advertising market and the fixed delay time. Formally, I, 0l    , 
I, 0l M    , and I, 0l T    . 
3. The higher system usage rate will lead to less advertisments but the increase of the fixed delay 
time and the size of advertising market will cause more advertisements. Formally, I 0a    , 
I 0a M
   , and I 0a T   . 
In case I, because being no directly relevant to advertising revenue and capacity cost, the optimal 
demand for the high-quality service is to keep the half of consumers in the market no matter how the 
market changes. The strategy that the service provider deals with the demand for the high-quality 
service just like the case of only single version without the concerns of advertising revenue and 
capacity cost. The advertising revenue and the capacity cost are determined by the demand for the 
cloud service (that is, total demand), rather than the demand for the high-quality version in the cloud 
service; therefore, the optimal demand for the high-quality service is fixed in case I.  
Accordingly, if there are more advertisers in the market, the service provider can receive more 
advertising revenue by raising the advertising level and consumer’s demand. In fact, the service 
provider will lower subscription fees for the two services in order to increase consumer’s demand 
( I, 0hp M
   and I, 0lp M   ). When the system usage rate increases, the service provider will 
lower the advertising level because raising the subscription fees can smooth the decline of profit, 
which is more efficient than raising the level of advertising for lowering consumer’s demand 
( I, 0lp    and I, 0hp    ). In addition, for the high-quality service, because consumers with 
high sensitivity to service quality dislike advertising, so there is room for raising the subscription fee if 
the advertising level can be reduced. That is, the service provider overcomes the problem of the 
increasing system usage by charging more subscription fees from consumers. 
The fixed delay time in this case is essential because the service quality between the two versions 
will be the same if the fixed delay time is absent. The increase of the fixed delay time is beneficial to 
the profit of the service provider. As the fixed delay time increases, because both versions are offered 
with advertisements and the advertising level doesn’t affect the demand for the high-quality service, 
the service provider can increase the advertising level but lower the price of the low-quality service to 
enhance his/her profit ( I, 0lp T
   ). However, once the price of the low-quality service decreases, 
some of consumers who prefer the high-quality service before may change mind to purchase the low-
quality service and then the optimal demand for the high-quality service is destroyed. The contribution 
of the fixed delay time is to make those consumers subscribing the high-quality service have no 
incentive to purchase the low-quality service instead because they have high sensitivity to the fixed 
delay time. Next, we list the difference between case I and II as follows. 
 
Lemma 2. Separating QoS but Pooling Advertising (Case II) 
1. The optimal demand for the high-quality service decreases in the system usage rate, but increases 
with the fixed delay time. Formally, II, 0h    and II, 0h T    . 
2. The increase of the system usage rate doesn’t affect the optimal advertising level and the optimal 
demand for the cloud computing service. Formally, II, 0l    and II 0a    . 
In case II, as the system usage rate increases, because capacity cost is positively associated with 
the demand for the high-quality service, the service provider will raise the price of the high-quality 
service to reduce the demand for the high-quality service ( II, 0hp    ). As a result, the demand for 
the low-quality service increases. In addition, we find that the service provider won’t change the price 
of the low-quality service ( II, 0lp    ) and the advertising level. The result exhibits that the 
advertising level is irrelevant to the system usage rate since the capacity cost is only associated with 
the demand for the high-quality service. Increasing the subscription fee of the low-quality service will 
lead to the increase of consumer’s arrival rate in the high-quality service, while decreasing the price of 
the low-quality service is worse than increasing the price of the high-quality service; consequently, the 
service provider keeps the price of the low-quality service as before. 
In case I, because the demand for the high-quality service doesn’t affect the expense of capacity, 
the optimal demand for the high-quality service is half of the size of consumer market. However, in 
case II, since the demand for the high-quality service affects the expense of capacity, the optimal 
demand of the high-quality service is less than half of the size of consumer market. That is, ignoring 
the effect of capacity cost, increasing the demand for the high-quality service can boost revenue 
through subscription fees. There are two straightforward approaches to increase the demand for the 
high-quality service. One is to lower the price of the high-quality service, and the other is to degrade 
the service quality of the low-quality service. Obviously, lowering the price of the high-quality service 
cannot compensate a rise in the capacity cost. Accordingly, if the fixed delay time gets higher, some of 
the consumers choosing the low-quality service before will select the high-quality service, which leads 
to the increase of the subscription revenue in the high-quality service. In addition, for those using the 
low-quality service, because they are low sensitivity to advertisements, the service provider can lower 
the price of the low-quality service ( II, 0lp T
   ) but increase the level of advertising. Although the 
price of the low-quality service decreases, the increase of the fixed delay time makes those prefer the 
high-quality service before have no incentive to choose the low-quality service. Actually, the 
increasing demand for the high-quality service will lead to a higher capacity cost, but the increase of 
advertising income can compensate the loss. 
 
Lemma 3. Pooling QoS but Separating Advertising (Case III) 
1. The demand for the cloud computing service may increase or decrease with the fixed delay time, 
but the demand for the high-quality service and the advertising level often increase with the fixed 
delay time. Formally, there exists III,ˆ 1 2l  such that III, 0l T    if III, III,ˆl l   and 
III, 0l T    if III, III,ˆl l   . Moreover, III 0a T   and III, 0h T    as long as III, 1 2l   . 
2. The total demand, the demand for the low-quality service, and the advertising level decrease in 
the system usage rate. Formally, III, 0h    , III, 0l    , and III 0a    . 
3. The demand for the high-quality service often decreases in the size of advertising market, but the 
advertising level and the total demand for the cloud computing service may increase with the size 
of advertising market. Formally, III, 0h M    if IIIa and III,ls are higher than one. Moreover, 
III, 0l M    and III 0a M   . 
In case III, although there is no closed form for the optimal demand and advertising level, we can 
still derive some interesting findings when the outside environment changes. First, a low III,l   
implicitly means that the demand of advertising market is strong and capacity cost is inexpensive. As 
the fixed delay time increases, our analytical result shows that the optimal advertising level, total 
demand, and the demand for the high-quality service will increase if III,l  is less than 1/2. Obviously, 
since the low-quality service is downgraded by the fixed delay time, the optimal demand for the high-
quality service, intuitively, gets higher. The advertising level and total demand also increase with the 
fixed delay time because the advertising income can offset the negative impact of the fixed delay time 
on the subscription revenue received from the low-quality service. On the other hand, a high III,l   
implicitly means the demand of adverting market is weak and the capacity cost is expensive. When 
III,l  is higher than 1/2, although we cannot find the opposite results regarding the optimal advertising 
level and the optimal demand for the high-quality service through intensive numerical experiments, we 
can derive numerical evidences to support our analytic result that the total demand for the cloud 
computing service gets lower if the fixed delay time increases and III,l  is sufficiently high. 
When the system usage rate gets higher, case I and case III have the same results other than the 
demand for the high-quality service. The difference is caused by separating strategy on advertising 
implemented in case III. Although lowering the demand for the high-quality service cannot reduce the 
capacity cost, it helps enhance the advertising revenue. As for the increase of the size of advertising 
market, the service provider, as usual, raises the advertising level and the total demand for the cloud 
computing service. In addition, in most situations, the service provider will lower the demand for the 
high-quality service to enhance the revenue form advertising because the advertising income is 
positively associated with the demand of the low-quality service. 
In case IV, all analytical results are consistent with those in case III. In addition, when the base 
service quality gets lower (that is, a lowerd ), the optimal advertising level will becomes higher. 
Obviously, because the subscription fee which can be charged from the consumers subscribing the 
low-quality service gets smaller, the best strategy to smooth the decline of the profit is to increase the 
advertising level since these consumers are not sensitive to the advertising level. In the following, we 
list the comparisons among the four cases as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. 
1. Free service may exist when the size of advertising market is large enough; however, the cost 
behind free service for consumers is to receive much advertisement. Formally, , 0i l M    and 
0ia M
   . 
2. Other than case II, a higher system usage rate will cause lower total demand and advertising level 
for the cloud computing service. Formally, , 0i l    and 0ia    where IIi  . 
3. A higher fixed delay time often results in higher total demand for the cloud computing service. 
Formally, , 0i l T    for case I and II, and it also holds for case III and IV if , 1 2i l   . 
Comparing these four cases, we find that the cloud computing service provider has incentive to 
offer free service as long as the demand for advertisements is afford to compensate the capacity cost. 
Today, most cloud computing services, like Google Apps, offer free service with the cost of 
advertising. Prior studies highlight the reason that free services are caused by network externality, so 
more users leads to higher revenue. Our research result points out the importance of advertising 
market because free services, in fact, can be provided by advertisers even if the absent of network 
externality. In addition, when the system usage rate gets higher, it is straightforward to limit the 
demand for the cloud computing service to reduce capacity cost. In this research, we have observed 
the phenomenon. Under pooling strategy for QoS (that is, case I and III), it is intuitive because the 
capacity cost is positively associated with the total demand for the cloud computing service. Under 
separating strategy for QoS, if the service provider implements pooling strategy for advertising, there 
is no impact of the system usage rate on the total demand; however, the service provider can more 
flexibly control the distribution of versions when the separating strategy for advertising are 
implemented instead. 
Finally, we observe an interesting result that the total demand is nearly positively associated with 
the fixed delay time. Since the total demand may increase with the fixed delay time, implementing 
separating strategy for QoS can save the expensive capacity cost when the mechanism of the fixed 
delay time is adopted. In real world, most file exchange services we survey implement separating 
strategy for QoS if general users have to wait for the fixed delay time. In addition, we can implicitly 
infer that users may enjoy free service if they have to wait until the fixed delay time is completed. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This study explores the commonly used versioning technique in cloud computing services and 
examines the impact of capacity cost, the size of advertising market, and the fixed delay time on the 
advertising level and the distribution of versions. Our findings complement Jin’s work (2000; 2007) 
and indicate that a service provider has incentive to implement price discrimination under other 
considerations even if network externality is absent. In addition, we also examine four different cases 
in which a service provider can consider offering the same QoS for all consumers or only the 
consumers subscribing the high-quality service. In addition, the service provider can decide whether to 
offer services with advertisement for all consumers or only the consumers subscribing the low-quality 
service. 
We find that the service provider often lowers total demand when the system usage rate increases; 
however, an exception occurs when the service provider implements pooling strategy for advertising 
but separating strategy for QoS. In addition, we find that free services may exist but run with 
advertisement or a fixed delay time. Finally, we also suggest that a service provider can utilize the 
fixed delay time to make more consumers view advertisements when advertising market is weak and 
the service provider also adopts separating strategy for advertising. However, if the service provider 
adopts pooling strategy for advertising, he/she can consider setting a fixed delay only if the demand of 
advertising market is strong and capacity cost is sufficiently low. 
In the future research, we will numerically compare the profits among the four cases because 
there is no closed form for case III and IV. In addition, it is possible that the advertising option and the 
fixed delay time option can be combined together and then the advertising window cannot be closed 
and the service doesn’t work until the fixed delay time is completed. This policy has been 
implemented in many digital content distribution services like Tudou (www.tudou.com), a digital 
content sharing platform in China. Finally, we can consider that digital resource is also provided by 
users and the service provider’s mission is to manage a two-sided platform. Many prior studies have 
explored the issue but few of them consider price discrimination in a two-sided platform. 
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